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Abstract
We examine the problem of designing performance contracts with multiple agents when principals
must compete for quality teams from a heterogeneous pool of agents. The trade-off principals face be-
tween good recruiting and good team performance provides micro foundations for agents to form stable
matches, and for initially identical principals to adopt different organizational schemes. The equilibrium
pattern of team formation exhibits two distinct, and inversely related, forms of assortative matching.
We find that a greater share of principals offering diverse performance incentives across teammates (ex-
tensive margin), leads to a lesser degree of heterogeneity in abilities within teams on average (intensive
margin). We apply the model to firm behavior to examine the mix of jobs offered and the degree of
performance pay in a general equilibrium environment. At the aggregate level, increases in the supply
of high-skilled workers leads to a polarization of jobs offered, i.e. relatively greater use of high- and low-
skill occupations, consistent with changing labor demands in recent history. Moreover, skill accumulation
among the labor force induces more firms to offer a steep set of performance contracts.
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Introduction
Many principal-agent relationships begin at recruitment so that principals are concerned with attracting
high-quality teams of agents, as well as eliciting optimal performance from the team during production.
Firms are obvious examples since they must compete with one another for a high-ability workforce, and
then write incentive contracts that allow them to be competitive in product markets. In general equilibrium,
firms need to manage a trade-off between contracts that lead to good recruiting and contracts that lead
to good team performance. We examine the contracting problem with multiple agents, where agents are
heterogeneous and form teams (matches) voluntarily. Principals have organizational choices regarding how
to manage the incomplete information environment by directing the efforts of agents toward success. Put
differently, principals can offer different job mixes to balance the incentives of agents to form stable matches
and exert effort. We apply this principal-agent framework to the contracting problems faced by firms and
explore how changing labor and product market conditions alter the provision of performance pay, the mix
of occupations offered and matching outcomes among the labor force.
A central thesis of this analysis is that identical principals may endogenously select different organi-
zational forms when balancing recruiting and performance incentives. The availability of micro-data has
revealed flexibility in both the composition of labor demands and the provision of performance payments
within individual firms. Cun˜at and Guadalupe (2009) link firm provision of incentive contracts among US
manufacturing firms to recent waves of globalization, while Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) and Bresnahan et al.
(2002) demonstrate that labor demands within firms have shifted across skills and occupations. Understand-
ing the economic forces which drive these patterns, particularly at the micro-level, requires a framework with
multiple-agent contracting, agent heterogeneity and organizational choices available to principals.
While we are interested primarily in the organization of individual firms, we consider the contracting
problem in a competitive environment for two reasons. First, principals balance the incentives for quality
performance, within the firm, against the incentives of the labor force, outside the firm, to form production
teams. A competitive matching market for agents best describes the outside forces that principals must
consider. Second, the organizational flexibility of firms has manifested into aggregate labor market trends in
recent decades. Many countries have witnessed job polarization - jobs which require the highest, and lowest,
skills have become larger shares of total employment, while demand for moderate skill levels has waned1 -
1This polarization of the work force is observed across several developed countries: see Goos and Manning (2007), Autor,
Katz and Kerney (2006), Goos, Manning and Salomons (2009), and Autor and Dorn (2009). At the aggregate level, some have
argued for a hybrid of forces as determinants of polarizing labor demands such as globalization plus non-neutral technological
change. Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2009) find weak evidence that routine moderate-skilled tasks are being offshored by
European economies while technologies have shifted towards use of workers performing non-routine tasks. See also Autor, Levy
and Murnane (2003). Feenstra and Hanson (2003) and Trefler and Zhu (2005) argue that offshoring and trade with developing
countries has lead to changes in the specific factor services demanded and rising inequality.
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and an increasing share of the labor force receiving some version of performance-pay2. In order to connect
these aggregate trends to firm-level adjustments, the principal’s contracting and organizational problems
must be considered in a competitive environment3.
The framework developed here embeds a familiar principal-agent relationship in to a general equilibrium
setting. Principals are concerned with writing contracts that allow them to be competitive in both input and
output markets. Our approach uses the insights from Lazear (2000) that the provision of performance-pay
brings productivity gains largely through better recruiting of workers. Principals recruit a team of agents
from a pool with a continuum of abilities without costs or frictions. Yet, the agents recruited must agree to
be matched and assigned to their respective jobs. Information problems inhibit agents from conveying efforts
to their supervising principal, though agents who exert more effort send better signals of performance.
Principals must decide how to reward (potentially) heterogeneous agents in an attempt to elicit optimal
effort. Each principal also has options regarding how to interact with agents during production. A principal
can offer a relatively diverse mix of jobs and interact with a foreman more closely, or interact with each
member of the team similarly. Workers elected as foremen of their team are able to send more reliable signals
of their performance, while constraints on the ability of principals to exchange information dictate that the
efforts of the foreman’s counterpart are generally less productive. Interaction with a worker leads to pro-
portional increases in signal quality, favoring high skilled workers more heavily. Thus the two organizational
choices of job mix are equivalent to offering either a pair of intermediate-skill occupations, or one high-skill
and one low-skill job in each firm.
The choice of job mix is aimed at optimizing recruiting outcomes. To understand how principals can
improve recruiting by altering the composition of jobs they offer, consider team formation by agents. Agents
form matches voluntarily and must compete for the best partners and best jobs. When motivating a team
of heterogeneous agents, principals optimally adopt a wage scheme that rewards team successes more inten-
sively4. In response of each agent seeks out the highest skilled partner available to raise the possibility of
earning team rewards. As a result the equilibrium pattern of team formation is characterized by positive
2See Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009)
3The distinction between firm-level and aggregate labor market outcomes is important, as Dunne et al. (2004) find that wage
inequality rose across US manufacturing firms between 1970 and 1992, while wage dispersion fell or remained constant within
firms over the same period. To be specific, within-firm wage dispersion of all workers, and of production workers, exhibited no
trend over time, while wage dispersion among non-production workers fell.
4In equilibrium all matches will be between agents of different ability. We present the simplest version of the principal-agent
relationship where agents work on independent tasks simultaneously. This environment contains the weakest incentive for
assortative matching or heterogeneous organizations to arise in equilibrium because there are no strategic interaction built into
the production process. In essences we are stacking the deck against ourselves. One may prefer to model production at the firm
such that a foreman takes a leadership role, and the remaining agent chooses her effort level in response. Though a hierarchy
is a more intuitive representation of the firm production process, the qualitative results are reenforced by the coordination
of agent efforts. For simplicity, and to avoid the results driven only by exogenously given production processes, we focus on
simultaneous actions over independent tasks.
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assortative matching: relatively high ability agents paired together and relatively low ability agents matched
together.
Principals with the misfortune of hiring teams of two low-quality agents are not likely to be satisfied.
Some may decide to alter their strategy, and offer one job as a foreman with relatively closer monitoring
and one job with little supervision. The possibility of obtaining a job as a foreman is welcomed; high ability
agents will seek out the opportunity to send more reliable signals to their supervisor. Thus a principal
can avoid weak recruiting outcomes by offering one job as a foreman, and a job with little supervision - as
opposed to two jobs with an similar division of labor.
We characterize an equilibrium such that no agent has an incentive to rematch with a different partner,
and no principal has an incentive to change her payment scheme or job composition. That is, we focus on a
stable allocation in the core. Several striking features emerge. First, though principals are identical initially,
ex post they are endogenously heterogenous with respect to the composition of jobs offered and agents
recruited. Differences in skill compositions across teams arise without bias. All principals have the same
capability to supervise agents, so that competition results in similar average recruiting outcomes. Principals
that offer similar occupations hire two agents with intermediate ability levels. Principals that offer a diverse
job mix hire the most able workers in the economy as foremen and the least skilled agents to receive little
supervision. Though average recruiting success is similar across principals, the composition of workers varies
depending on the chosen organizational form.
Second, team formation by agents exhibits two distinct types of positive assortative matching. Agents
employed in a job mix with similar occupations form matches with positive assortment from a conjoined
ability set. On the other hand, the highest skilled agents obtain jobs as foremen within a diverse job mix,
match with lower ability agents from a disjoint ability set. There is positive assortative matching across
occupations, between the most and least able workers. As a result the equilibrium mix of jobs available is
crucial in describing the overall degree of heterogeneity within teams.
A third feature of an equilibrium is that differences in organizational choices lead to variation in the
returns to skill across agents. The appointment of high skilled agents to be foremen allows them to send
more reliable signals of their performance, while moderate and low skill workers are paid less on average
(effort constant) because of their weaker signals. This is consistent with the results in Lemieux (2006) that
returns to ability are heterogeneous across skills/education, and Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent’s (2009)
finding high ability workers receive payments more closely tied to their performance.
In a static environment the trade-off firms principal’s between good performance and good recruiting
generates an interesting, and empirically relevant, allocation of jobs, incentive contracts, and agents. We
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also consider a key comparative static to explain changes in the employment shares of occupations that have
been observed over the last three decades. In particular we show that an increase in the relative supply
of high skilled workers leads to a greater prevalence of firms that offer high-skill occupations and low-skill
occupations. Polarization of the workforce, or hollowing-out of the middle class, is an endogenous response
to relative increases in the supply of high skilled workers5. Likewise, more firms offer strong performance
pay in response to skill accumulation. The reason being that as more relatively high-skilled agents become
available, organizational forms with the benefit of recruiting a single high-performing agent begin to dominate
organizational forms that divide production risks across moderately-skilled agents.
We feel the contribution of this article is three-fold. First, we demonstrate how firm heterogeneity in
skill compositions, rather than skill biases, arises endogenously in a competitive environment. There are
several analyses of why firms select technologies that favor a particular type of skilled worker: for example
see Acemoglu (1999 & 2001), Acemoglu and Shimer (2000), Albrecht and Vroman (2002), and Yeaple (2005)
for examples in different labor and product market environments. Little attention has been paid to the
causes of differences in skill composition at the micro, or firm, level. Regardless of looking at aggregate or
firm-specific labor demands, the evidence does not support skill-biased technological change as a single force
affecting labor markets in recent history6.
Second, by allowing differences in the organization of firms to arise naturally, we are able to describe a
new feature of equilibrium team formation. We find that the diversity of occupations offered in equilibrium
is inversely related to the degree of heterogeneity in matches. In other words, as more firms offer a diverse
mix of jobs (extensive margin), the degree of worker heterogeneity within firms shrinks on average (inten-
sive margin). A great deal of the matching literature emphasizes the conditions sufficient for assortative
matching to arise. (See Shimmer and Smith 2000 for search environments, Legros and Newman 2002 for fric-
tionless markets and Legros and Newman 2007 & 2009 for settings with non-transferable utilities.) Focusing
on job mix, we are able to describe both the extent and intensity of assortative matching in competitive
environments.
5Acemoglu (1997, 1998, 2001) first demonstrated that an increase in the supply of high-skilled labor could induce more firms
to offer high-skill jobs in models of one-to-one firm-worker matching. Note the difference here that increases in aggregate skill
levels generate increases in both high-skill and low-skill occupations, consistent with stylized facts discussed above.
6Two notable exceptions that highlight the endogenous structure of firms given labor market conditions are Acemoglu and
Newman (2002) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006). In the former, the authors relate labor market conditions across
countries to differences in employment structure. Whereas here, we are interested in the variation in the mix of jobs offered by
firms competing in the same labor market, and facing a heterogenous supply of workers. Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg describe
the organization of firms that face the problem of effectively organizing the knowledge of heterogeneous workers. As we have
done here, they show that skill accumulation can lead to changes in the overall distribution of income, as well as wage dispersion
within occupations, that fit recent trends. The primary distinction between our analyses is our focus on the composition of
occupations and the prevalence of performance pay. Here ex ante identical firms adopt different organizational forms. The
endogenous behavior of firms provides a unified explanation of polarizing labor demands as the supply of high-skilled workers
rises, the greater incidence of performance payments, and changes in wage dispersion within and across firms.
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Finally, our analysis is also related to a long literature on agency theory. In particular, our model draws
on analyses of contracting with multiple agents; see Green and Stokey (1983), Mookherjee (1984), Itoh (1991)
and Che and Yoo (2001). While much of this literature is aimed at issues of providing optimal incentives
to agents, our framework is distinct in that the participants of each contract are determined endogenously
via matching and assignment behavior. The analyses most closely related to ours are Serfes (2005) and
Dam and Perez-Castrillo (2006). They each explore the matching outcomes between a principal and a single
agent, rather than the contracting problem with multiple agents. Using their parlance, we highlight the one-
sided matching problem between heterogeneous agents, whereas they focus solely on the two-sided matching
problem between principals and agents7.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section builds a model of production, and describes the actors
in the economy. Section 2 derives a unique equilibrium, defined as a stable allocation in the core. Section
3 discusses the properties of the equilibrium. Section 4 examines how skill accumulation among the labor
force shifts the aggregate mix of occupations available in the labor force, and the prevalence of performance
pay. In section 5 we show how the model and results can be generalized to an environment with many job
types available at each firm. The final section concludes.
1 Model
The model described in this section provides a framework to examine the mix of occupations, as measured
by skill-content, and the provision of incentive contracts that are available at individual firms. Thus we
require three elements. First, each firm (principal) can offer multiple types of employment opportunities.
This allows us to describe the composition of jobs within firms, as well as across firms. Second, worker
(agent) heterogeneity is introduced to correspond to the measuring of occupations by skill. Third, inability
to observe worker effort necessitates some form of performance payments. These three elements are detailed
below.
1.1 Production and Information
Production at each firm occurs in teams of two agents supervised by a single principal. Within the team,
each agent works on a specific task that is physically independent of her partner’s duties. The production
7The literature on micro-finance has also considered team formation under different risk strategies. For example, lenders
make choices about group- or individual- liability agreements with borrower heterogeneity. See Genicot and Ray (2003), Ahlin
and Townsend (2006), and Maderia and Townsend (2008). Our current framework differs from previous analyses in that
principals have organizational choices regarding how to mitigate the risk from individuals in addition to the choice of payment
scheme. More importantly, in the general equilibrium environment here, the outside option of each agent is endogenously
determined by the competitive environment.
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process is replete with information problems. Each principal supervises production, but even though the
agents’ abilities are known, principals cannot perfectly observe the efforts of the agents working under her.
There are two important features of the information problem inherent during production. First, each agent
can put forth effort to improve the signal that he sends to the principal. An agent sends a signal of success
with probability p(·), which is continuously increasing in her effort level, e.
The second feature of the information problem is that principals have the capability to advise agents
in their efforts. That is, principals can provide direction that benefits agent effort, though efforts are still
unobserved. Interaction with the principal improves the quality of agent performance by a total factor Γ > 0.
For example the principal observes successful completion by both agents with probability Γp (e1) p (e2).
The specific characteristics of the efforts put forth by agents and the supervision by principals are de-
scribed below. For now we impose a few regularity conditions on the production environment. Effort
improves the probability of good performance with decreasing returns. Principals can never fully direct
the activities of those working under her. To be specific, the information exchanged through effort and
supervision satisfies
0 ≤ Γp(e) < 1, p′ (e) > 0, and p′′ (e) ≤ 0.
In order to ensure an equilibrium where strategic interactions between agents in a team exists, and that
principals are concerned with their relative incentives to provide effort, we also assume that
p′′ (e1) p′′ (e2) p (e1) p (e2)− [p′ (e1) p′ (e2)]2 > 0
With these informational constraints the principal can realize four potential states during production:
receive positive signal from both, receive negative signal from both, and receive positive signal from either
agent accompanied by a negative signal from the other agent. Success by either agent generates a single unit
of the numeraire good8.
In what follows we will describe the behavior of principals and agents within this production and infor-
mation environment. Yet it is worthwhile to first provide a picture of how the contest evolves. All decisions,
agent matching & efforts, as well as job mix & performance contracts from principals, are made simulta-
neously. Within the single period agents are free to reconsider their matches, given the behavior of their
8Assuming that agents work independently and simultaneously erodes any complementarities that would arise from strategic
interaction. However, production environments that seem more intuitive representations of the firm, say hierarchies with
sequential moves or effort coordination, only reinforce the results derived below. Kim (2010) studies the endogenous formation
of agent hierarchies and sequential games. He shows that equilibrium payment schemes will be identical to what follows. See
also Che and Yoo (2001)
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employing principal. Likewise principals are free to alter the wage scheme and occupations offered, given the
team they recruited. Put differently, employment at firms and matching between agents are at-will agree-
ments. Both agents and principals understand that renegotiation or reconsideration of behavior requires
them to enter a new phase of competition for good jobs and good teams. A stable equilibrium occurs when
no agent or principal has an incentive to seek new opportunities.
To fix ideas, consider the behavior of both principals and agents just prior to production. Each principal
announces the wage scheme she will use to reward agents, and the manner in which she will advise each
member of the team. Considering the menu of opportunities available from principals, agents compete for
quality matches, quality occupations and subsequently decide on effort levels. Principals then recruit teams
competitively. Given the allocation of agents to principals, production could occur.
Yet, some principals may not be satisfied with the team that they recruit and therefore may have an
incentive to alter their original contract. As some principals offer different contracts, agents reconsider their
initial matches in light of a new menu of options. This process of reconsideration continues until all principals
are satisfied with their recruits and all agents are satisfied with their match, given the expected competition.
Upon reaching stable matching outcomes, job mixes, and incentive contracts, production occurs immediately.
As more details about the model emerge the reader should bear in mind that the equilibrium concept we
employ is that of the core. We are seeking a stable allocation with the composition of jobs offered and
matches determined endogenously.
1.2 Principals
There is an unbounded mass of identical principals who can choose to engage in production freely. Imme-
diately before production each principal must compete for a team of agents in a competitive market. The
objective of each principal is to maximize profits net of payments to the two agents working under her. The
behavior of each principal is characterized a by mix of jobs offered (intended to attract high quality teams)
and a choice of payment scheme (used to elicit effort from individual team members).
1.2.1 Job Mix
Informational constraints inhibit the ability of principals to observe their agents’ efforts perfectly. All
principals can improve the reliability of the performance signals they receive from their team members
with the same proficiency Γ > 0. However each principal has two options regarding the composition of jobs
to offer agents. Each organizational form allows the principal to appoint one team member to be a foreman
who can be advised more closely. For example, two different fund managers may be responsible for separate
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accounts, but the investment brokerage may choose to direct the activities of one fund manger more closely
toward the clients’ goals. Another possibility is that two product designers can be assigned to develop a
new component for use in production, and management can choose to observe the progress made by one
developer more than the other. Nearly all firms are multi-product firms. Each agent may be assigned to a
single product line, while the firm makes different investments in advertising each product to consumers. So
the foreman can be interpreted as the agent in charge of the firm’s core product line, and her counterpart in
charge of an ancillary product line.
While both organizational forms appoint one worker to be a foreman, they differ in how the monitoring
capability of the principal, Γ, is divided across agents. The first composition of jobs (k=1) allows the
principal to give similar direction regarding how efforts can be steered toward success. That is, she can offer
jobs with a relatively similar division of labor. The second (k=2) provides a more diverse composition of
jobs such that the foreman receives much direction from the principal, while the efforts of the remaining
agent go relatively undirected.
To be specific let γk be the improvement to the signal of the foreman under organizational form k, while
γk is the direction given to her counterpart. The differences in the composition of jobs across organizational
forms are given by
γ2 < γ1 < γ1 < γ2 (JM.1)
where the principal limited span of control requires
γ1γ1 = Γ = γ2γ2 (JM.1)
Devoting more time to one agent improves the chance that her efforts lead to success. The probability that
agent i, assigned to occupation γi, sends a positive signal of performance, γip (ei), is enhanced for any ei. Yet
agents are free to vary their behavior by choosing different effort levels under varying degrees of supervision.
In this sense, abilities translate across occupations9.
Principals have choices about how to manage information across agents, but they face the same infor-
mation problem over the team as a whole, regardless of the job mix or incentive contracts. Restricting
principals’ spans of control of information, Γ, to be identical simplifies the setting to that of one-sided het-
erogeneity10. More importantly it highlights the tradeoff that principals face – between recruiting quality
9Bandiera et al. (2007) find that management makes specific choices about which workers to direct more or less intensively.
Interestingly, this choice reflects the incentive contracts that individual managers face.
10See Dam and Perez-Castrillo (2006) for two-side matching between principals and heterogeneous agents. Note the key
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teams, and eliciting good agent performance – because principals with the same ability must compete for
high-quality teams.
1.2.2 Performance Payments
In addition to choosing which occupations to offer the principal also chooses incentive contracts to motivate
workers where effort cannot be observed. Incentive contracts vary payments based on the individual perfor-
mance of agents. Every principal sets the rewards for each type of signal received: she chooses the payments
V s when both agents succeed, V w to the agent with a good signal and V l to the agent with a bad signal
when they are different, and V o to each agent when neither succeeds11 .
Though these payments can vary continuously, and be made commensurate with the ability of agents,
we can classify them in the typical way. A payment scheme is said to be Joint Performance Evaluation
(JPE) if
(
V s, V l
)
> (V w, V o) and Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) if
(
V s, V l
)
< (V w, V o). Note
that under JPE there are strong team incentives since an agent in made better off by good performance of
her partner. On the other hand, RPE provides strong competitive incentives since agents are best off when
they outperform their partners.
1.2.3 Principal’s Objective
Principals maximize expected profits by choosing (1) the composition of jobs to offer, and (2) a payment
scheme in order to attract the highest potential quality team and to incentivize worker effort. We impose a
limited liability constraint such that agents cannot be forced to make payments to principals regardless of
their performance.
V s, V w, V l, V o ≥ 0
With a limited liability constraint on performance payments note that the agents’ participation constraints
are non-binding. Then any V l, V o > 0 decreases agent effort, inducing principals to optimally set V l = V o =
0. Setting the price of output to be the numeraire, each principal solves the following problem subject to
JM.1 and JM.2:
difference between our analyses in that we examine the multi-agent contracting problem where heterogeneous agents form
matches voluntarily.
11Note that firms offer the same performance contract for each member of the team, rather than writing individual contracts
for each agent. This does not preclude the principal from offering individual incentive schemes such that vs = vw. It also
corresponds to the findings of wage compression in Baker et al. (1994) due to strong cohort effects and in Fang and Moscarini
(2005) due to the potential hazards of poor morale.
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max
γi,γj
V s,V w,V l,V o
E{γip (ei) γjp (ej) [1− 2V s] + [1− γip (ei) γjp (ej)− (1− γip (ei)) (1− γjp (ej))] [1− V w]
The next section describes the behavior of agents which provides endogenous incentive compatibility
constraints on the principal’s optimization problem above.
1.3 Agents
The mass of agents is normalized to unity12. Individual agents are differentiated with respect to ability.
Higher ability agents can exert effort, e, at a lower marginal cost to their overall utility. The ability of an
agent is given by a, and her marginal cost of effort is 1a . The distribution of ability is assumed to be atomless
and given by G(a) on [amin, amax]13.
Agents are risk adverse and make two choices to maximize their utility. First, agents must decide with
whom they are willing to form a team knowing that they will have to compete for quality matches, and
perhaps jobs that offer relatively close direction. Second, given their match, job type and wage scheme
imposed, agents must decide what level of effort to put forth. Agent behavior is best illustrated by working
backwards from a stable matching allocation. Once matched and employed, each agent maximizes her
indirect utility function, V, for the benefits of income realized from performance payments, u (·), by choosing
her effort level, given her own ability, the ability of her partner, and job type. That is, agent i solves the
following problem
Vi = max
ei
γip (ei) γjp (ej)u (V s) + γip (ei) [1− γjp (ej)]u (V w)− 1
αi
ei
where γi satisfies equations (JM.1) and (JM.2) and the utility function satisfies u′(·) > u(0) = 0 > u′′(·).
Having fully described the actors in the economy as well as the production environment the next step is to
derive an equilibrium.
12Note that with two job types at each firm, this limits the equilibrium mass of principals to 1/2. We maintain the assumption
of an unbounded mass of potential entrants as principals to accommodate the generalization of the model to multiple occupations
in section 5.
13By assuming that abilities have an atomless distribution we are implicitly assuming that there is an even mass of agents
with each type of ability. Hence if one agent with ability a is assigned to a particular occupation, then they all are. This
simplifies the analysis without changing any of the qualitative results.
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2 Equilibrium
In this economy, a full equilibrium is comprised of five elements: (1) the composition of jobs offered by all
firms - we define Σ as the share of jobs with similar direction according to k = 1; (2) an assignment of
workers to jobs with different degrees of supervision- let Ωγ be the sets of abilities assigned to a job with
given levels of direction d where γ = γ1, γ2, γ1, γ2, as in JM.1 and JM.2; (3) an allocation of workers into
teams- define M1 : Ωγ1 → Ωγ1 and M2 : Ωγ2 → Ωγ2 to be the matching functions that describe teams within
firms; (4) performance payments to agents; and (5) degrees of effort put forth by agents during production.
We are specifically interested in a core equilibrium where matching behavior and the composition of jobs are
stable given the competitive environment. The derivation of an equilibrium will proceed backwards from a
stable allocation, beginning with agent effort.
2.1 Agent Effort
Agent i’s behaves according to the following first order condition, choosing an effort level ei which satisfies
the following first order condition
1
αi
1
p′ (ei)
≡ γi [p (ej) γj(u (V s)− u (V w)) + u (V w)] (1)
Clearly, every agent’s effort is increasing in her own ability, given any wage scheme or occupation. For
simplicity we will describe agent preferences for matches and principal preferences for teams in terms of the
abilities of agents. Yet, the fact that greater ability leads to greater effort indicates that ability is indeed
the relevant feature during the matching process. An agent may put forth different levels of effort when
matched with various partners. But since agents cannot alter the incentives of their partners, i.e. equation
(1) must hold, variation in effort levels across different patterns of team formation has only second order
effects. One might like to change the effort level of her partner, but must resort to new matches in order to
experience real differences. As indicated by equation (1), agent efforts do respond to the payments offered
by principals, which are derived next.
2.2 Payments to Agents
The dual problem to the principal is to minimize payments to agents, subject the agents’ incentive com-
patibility conditions in equation (1). As mentioned above, payments for poor performance (V l or V 0) are
disincentives for agents to exert effort. Thus principals optimally set rewards for poor performance to zero.
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The following proposition describes the optimal incentive scheme chosen by principals given the willingness
of agents to provide effort.
Proposition 1 For either job mix (k=1,2), all principals will implement a Joint Performance Evaluation
wage scheme such that vs > vw, when teams are comprised of heterogeneous agents.
Proof. See Appendix
According to proposition 1, principals use relatively strong group incentives to motivate teammates with
different abilities. Even though agents work simultaneously on independent tasks, relative reward schemes
optimally balance the incentives of heterogeneous agents to provide effort14. A JPE wage scheme avoids
discouraging a lesser ability team member, where the marginal return to effort is greatest, given that she is
likely to be outperformed by her partner.
Though JPE is always the optimal type of incentive contract, the actual value of each payment varies
across teams. Principals recognize that agents exert effort with differing marginal cost to their overall
utility, and so make performance payments commensurate with the ability of the team recruited. The next
section turns to equilibrium team formation as workers match based on the anticipated payment scheme
from principals.
2.3 Agent Matching & Team Formation
Under a Joint Performance Evaluation payment scheme agents view the efforts of their partner as strategic
complements for their own; deidej > 0. As a result, every agent would prefer to obtain a high ability partner,
all else equal. However, agents must compete for their preferred partners, and so it is relative preferences for
partners’ abilities that determine matching outcomes. The relative benefits of own and partner’s abilities to
agent i’s expected payoff,Vi, are given by
∂2Vi
∂aj∂ai
= Γp′(ei)p′(ej)
dei
dai
dej
daj
[u(V s)− u(V w)] > 0 (2)
The relative benefits of payments (term in brackets), and the relative effort levels across abilities ( deidai )
are both positive when principals offer a JPE wage scheme. So equation (2) guarantees that individual
payoffs are supermodular in agent abilities. We cite the well known results from Legros and Newman (2007)
that supermodularity of individual payoffs is sufficient for positive assortative matching to arise for any
14Homogeneous agents face the same chances of success for their optimal effort level and hence individual rewards are sufficient
motivation. As shown in the appendix, the optimal incentive contract offered to homogeneous agents in Individual Performance
Evaluation with vs = vw. Proposition 1 is the relevant result in the current context since the organizational choices regarding
job mix will lead to heterogeneous matches in equilibrium for non-degenerate distributions of ability.
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distribution of ability. Thus M1 and M2 are non-decreasing and unique matching functions between workers
in corresponding occupations.
Matches are consummated between foremen and those with little direct monitoring according to positive
assortment within each job mix. Of course the assignments of workers to jobs occur endogenously, as derived
immediately below.
2.4 Agent Task Assignment
All workers benefit from greater supervision by their principal; hence all agents prefer jobs as foremen. Yet,
agents must compete for their preferred types of employment, and so it is relative preferences for job types
that determine assignments. Closer monitoring results in a proportional increase in signal quality that agents
send. Since higher ability agents can provide more effort (and hence perform better) at a lower cost to their
overall utility, greater abilities benefit proportionally more from employment as foreman. Given the discrete
differences in supervision one receives in each type of employment, and the fact information constraints
dictate ∆γj∆γi < 0, the relative benefits of supervision across agents are described formally by
∆
∆γi
(
∂Vi
∂ai
)
= p′ (ei)
dei
dai
u(V w) > 0 (3)
According to equation (3) agent payoff functions are supermodular in direction from principals and own
ability, which is sufficient for positive assignment of agents to occupations. Agents with the greatest ability
will be hired as foremen at firms offering diverse occupations; those with moderate ability will receive jobs
with moderate levels of supervision at firms with a similar division of labor; and the lowest ability agents
will obtain jobs with little supervision.
Figure 1 illustrates equilibrium matching outcomes and occupation assignments consistent with positive
assortment. Job assignments are characterized by the most able workers employed as foreman, and matched
positively with the remaining agents employed in the respective job mix. As seen in Figure 1, the highest
ability foremen are matched with the highest ability agent to not be employed as a foreman in the same
job mix. (Similarly the lowest ability foremen are matched with the lowest ability agents not employed as
a foreman in the same job mix, illustrated by the dashed arrows.) Intermediately skilled workers within A1
and A2 are employed in similar jobs that each offer moderate performance incentives. Those agents with
abilities greater than A2 and below A1 are employed by firms that offer a relatively diverse occupational
mix. Because an equal number of agents must be employed in each occupation, agents with abilities between
A1 and A2 form matches positively from either side of the median ability level.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Matching and Job Assignments
Consistent with positive assignment of workers to tasks, in equilibrium the sets Ωγ are given by15
Ωγ2 = [amin, A1), Ωγ1 = [A1, aMed), Ωγ1 = [aMed, A2), and Ωγ2 = [A2, amax] (4)
Equations (2) and (3) are sufficient conditions for positive matching between agents and positive as-
signment of workers to occupations. At this point it is worthwhile to discuss which features of the model
drive these results. The jobs that agents perform within each firm are physically independent, so principals
care only about the incentives of agents to provide effort during production. The production process has
no complementarities between the occupations. Positive assortative matching is a result of the strategic
behaviors about efforts which are endogenous to the model16. On the other hand, positive assignment of
workers is due to the modeled proportional increase in signal quality that comes from better jobs. If better
employment guaranteed only a fixed (additive) increase in monitoring, positive assignment may not arise.
As we are interested in describing an economy with various occupation types defined by their skill content,
we feel the proportional modeling choice is appropriate.
With behavior fully described across and within occupations, the two cutoffs A1 and A2 are sufficient to
describe the assignment of workers to jobs across firms and matching between agents within firms. Hence
the last component of a full equilibrium is the mass of each type of job available, as determined by these
15Without loss of generality agents with abilities equal to the cutoff values are assigned occupations with relatively higher
performance incentives.
16Any production environment such that principals offer JPE wage schemes would still lead to positive matching. Under JPE
incentive contracts u(V s)− u(V w) > 0 and hence equation (2) is still positive. Potential alternatives include agent hierarchies
with sequential moves and the potential for collusion on effort levels.
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Figure 2: Determining the Equilibrium Composition of Jobs
cutoffs.
2.5 Equilibrium Job Composition
Let Σ be equilibrium share of intermediate-skilled workers employed in similar occupations (k=1). Given
positive assignment across occupations, Σ is calculated by
Σ =
A2∫
A1
dG(a) (5)
The two equilibrium conditions that determine the two abilities cutoffs reflect the incentives and possibilities
of firms to offer each type of employment contract.
Principals decide which types of occupations they wish to offer, given that they must compete for qual-
ity recruits. Thus our first equilibrium condition is the principal’s Recruiting Indifference Condition: the
expected profit from the team a principal anticipates to recruit under job mix k=1 (i.e. the average interme-
diate team) must yield the same expected profit yielded by the anticipated team from offering occupations
according to job mix k=2 (i.e. the average diverse team).
Equilibrium assignments to occupations determine the quality of teams that each principal can expect to
recruit. Since principals are identical, they draw teams randomly according to their chosen job mix. For a
general distribution of ability, principals expect to draw agents with the average rank of ability; that is each
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principal expects to draw a team comprised of the median ability employed in the respective occupations17.
Define aγk the ability that any principal expects to recruit when offering a particular occupation γk, such
that
aγ1 ≡ med(Ωγ1) , aγ1 ≡ med(Ωγ1) , aγ2 ≡ med(Ωγ2), and aγ2 ≡ med(Ωγ2).
Let Π(·) denote expected profits earned per the principal’s objective function for expected recruiting out-
comes. Then the principal’s Recruiting Incentive Compatibility condition is
Π(aγ1 , aγ1 , γ1, γ1) ≡ Π(aγ2 , aγ2 , γ2, γ2) (6)
and is an implicit function of the equilibrium values A1 and A2. (See equation (4).)
The Recruiting Indifference Condition condition for each principal describes the relative incentives to
offer each type of job. The second equilibrium condition reflects the constraints on the occupations that
principals can actually make available. Every team is formed by two employment positions with a fixed
monitoring capability. Employment on either side of A1 and A2 must be balanced in that
A1∫
amin
dG(a) ≡
amax∫
A2
dG(a) (7)
The intersection of the Recruiting Indifference Condition and Balance Condition on employment jointly
determine the equilibrium job composition in that their intersection pins down equilibrium values of A1 and
A2.
A full equilibrium consists of the following: the mix of jobs offered and task assignments of agents,
Ωγ2 , Ωγ1 , Ωγ1 , Ωγ2 , which are determined by positive assignment according to equation (3), plus the
Recruiting Indifference Condition and Balance Conditions in (6) and (7); matching functions M1 and M2
consistent with positive assortative matching a prescribed by equation (2); JPE incentive contracts subject
to proposition 1; and agent effort levels that satisfy the first order condition in (1).
Proposition 2 An full equilibrium exists and is unique.
Proof. See appendix
The determination of the equilibrium job composition for a core allocation of the labor force is illustrated
in Figure 2. By definition of the cutoff values A1 and A2 from (4), each condition must lie above the 45o
17Principals cannot expect to recruit agents with abilities equal to supΩγk and inf Ωγk in the same team since this violates
positive assortative matching for any non-trivial assignment of agents to occupations. Moreover, principals cannot form expec-
tations with regard to the average skill assigned to each occupation. For general distributions of ability, the expected values
may not correspond to the same ranking across occupations, and hence cannot be considered as potential equilibrium recruits.
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diagonal and to the left of the median ability level. Implicit differentiation demonstrates that the slope of
the Balance Condition is strictly negative and more steep than the Recruiting Indifference Condition on the
interior. (See proof of proposition 2 in the Appendix.).
3 Discussion
In this economy principals choose an organizational form to balance a trade-off between quality recruiting
and quality team performance. For any interior solution of A1 & A2, there are some principals who offer
each type of job mix. Differences in organizational form can arise endogenously, even though principals
are identical in their capabilities to direct agents. A second source of heterogeneity across firms is the
skill composition of the workforce. These differences that arise in any equilibrium reflect the endogenous
assignments of workers to tasks in matching markets.
A last source of heterogeneity across firms is the actual recruiting outcomes. As principals all have the
same capability to monitor agents, variation in team quality occurs randomly among the shares of firms that
choose each job mix. It is worthwhile to note that (weighted) average recruiting outcomes are similar across
firms. The two workforce compositions are either high ability foremen are matched with low ability agents,
or firms that offer a similar division of labor over two moderately skilled agents. The choice of occupations
offered by principals is a best-response to the competition for a quality workforce. Yet, neither mix of jobs
represents a dominant strategy.
The potential for an equilibrium with heterogenous organizational choices by principals depends in the
underlying distribution of ability. However the following proposition states that only one organizational
choice can support an equilibrium with symmetric behavior by principals.
Proposition 3 For any distribution of agent ability, if all principals select the same job mix in equilibrium
they necessarily offer a similar division of labor according to k=1.
Proof. See Appendix.
All principals prefer to mitigate the risk of poor agent performance by interacting with both agents during
production. The only reason to appoint a single foreman with close interaction is if the reward is better
recruiting outcomes. When all principals offer the same job mix expected recruiting outcomes are identical,
and hence must reflect the benefits of hedging agent performances.
The equilibrium composition of jobs influences the outcomes for agents as well. Each agent’s maximum
utility is strictly greater when employed in occupations that offer relatively stronger performance payments
(i.e. foreman or moderate tasks). Moreover, there is second-order effect of better advising to agent effort.
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Equation (1) ensures that agents with jobs that provide better direction choose to exert more effort during
production. While the envelope condition ensures that this has negligible effects on the overall welfare of
agents, it does ensure that higher skilled agents are expected to earn greater observed wages via better
performance. This result is consistent with the findings of Lemieux (2006) of heterogeneous returns to skill.
Matching markets have two distinct problems to solve: (1) match intermediate ability agents and (2)
match high ability foremen to low skill agents. The strategic behavior of agents chasing the best rewards
for their efforts causes both of these matching problems to be resolved in a pattern of positive assortment.
Intermediately skilled agents form matches from the conjoined ability set between A1 and A2. On the other
hand, the highest skilled foreman, ability above A2, will be matched with agents from the disjoint set of
abilities below A1. These two types of positive assortative matching – heterogeneous matching within a
conjoined set of ability, and heterogenous matching across disjoint sets – are inversely related as the forces
that lead more principals to offer similar job types, necessarily reduces the share of principals that spread
production across diverse occupations. The implications of this inverse relationship for matching outcomes
are stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 In equilibrium, the greater the share of teams formed across a diverse job mix according
to k=2 (extensive margin), the smaller the differences in ability within teams (intensive margin) will be on
average.
Proof. Consider the average matching outcome between foremen and low skill workers with little supervision.
That is consider the team
(
aγ2 , aγ2
)
. The Balance condition is downward sloping so that across potential
equilibria, A1 and A2 are inversely related. A larger share of teams are formed across a diverse job mix
(k=2) is equivalent to an increase in A1 and a decrease in A2. As aγ2 and aγ2 are both increasing in the
respective cutoff, and aγ1 < aγ2 , it must be that an increase in A1 and a decrease in A2 causes aγ1 and aγ2
to converge. A parallel argument can be made for matching outcomes between A1 and A2.
4 Skill Accumulation
The fundamental intuition supporting this model is that firms consider the abilities of workers they expect
to recruit when they decide what mix of jobs, and what performance incentives to offer. How then do
changes in the shape of labor endowments influence the equilibrium composition of occupations and the
provision of performance payments? In this section we consider changes in the degree of competition in
factor markets by examining the impact of a shift in the overall distribution of agent ability toward high
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skills. The comparative static exercise is meant to capture the effects of skill accumulation among the labor
force.
Definition 1 G′(·) is said to be more a more skill abundant distribution of ability than G(·) if
G′(·) first-order stochastically dominates G(·).
This definition implies that an abundance of skills corresponds to greater masses of higher ability workers
at or below each skill level. Since firms take the overall distribution of recruits into account, definition 1 is
needed to relate the behavior of principals across distributions of abilities. The impact of skill accumulation
on the aggregate composition of jobs is stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 5 An accumulation of skills among the labor force leads to polarization of the work force.
Specifically, the employment shares of high- and low- skill occupations (k=2) rise, while intermediate-skill
occupations account for a smaller share of employment.
Proof. Let the share of intermediate-skill employment in an abundant distribution of ability be given by
Σ′, and let Σ be the respective employment share in a less abundant distribution. Then job polarization
is equivalent to Σ′ < Σ, or by calculation using equation (8), G′(A2) − G′(A1) < G(A2) − G(A1). The
equilibrium Balance condition implies that 1 − F (A2) = F (A1) for any distribution of ability F (·). Direct
substitution of the Balance condition establishes the result immediately. This result can be seen in Figure
2 noting that moving to a stochastically dominant distribution of ability rotates the Balance condition
downward about the vertical intercept.
Polarized labor demands across occupations are consistent with the experience of several countries, par-
ticularly the US, realizing smaller shares of middle-skill employment at the same time that high-skill workers
became more abundant. Goos and Manning (2007) find evidence of polarization in the UK. Autor, Katz
and Kerney (2006) provide evidence from the US, particularly in the 1990s. Goos, Manning and Salomons
(2009) find broad evidence of polarization in sixteen European nations. Demand shifts away from the middle
of the skill distribution appear large in magnitude; in the US for example, Autor and Dorn (2009) find that
the lowest and highest deciles of occupations each account for 10%-25% more of employment in 2005 than
observed twenty-five years earlier. The effects of these shifts in labor demand correspond to recent changes
in the aggregate wage distribution.
In addition, proposition 5 speaks to directly wage dispersion within firms as the supply of high ability
labor rises. Polarization is equivalent to an increase in A1 and a decrease in A2. Note that the average skill
of foremen in diverse teams, aγ2 , falls as A2 declines, while the average skill of lightly supervised workers,
aγ2 , will rise with A1. Skill accumulation causes the the average abilities workers across these occupations to
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converge, and the differences in their wages to fall on average. These effects are consistent with the evidence
provided by Dunne et al. (2004) for US manufacturing firms that rising wage dispersion was concentrated
across firms, rather than within.
An important corollary to proposition 5 relates skill accumulation to incidence of performance pay and
incentive contracts.
Corollary 1 An accumulation of skills among the labor force leads to a greater prevalence of strong perfor-
mance payments, most concentrated among the highest ability workers.
As high-skill workers become more abundant a larger share of firms find it optimal to try to recruit these
high-performing agents by offering them relatively stronger performance incentives. Corollary 1 matches the
empirical findings of Lemieux et al. (2009). The greater use of performance payments reflects firm recruiting
behavior, while the concentration of these contracts among high ability workers is a consequence of worker
assignment in competitive matching markets.
Proposition 5 relates aggregate labor demands to shape of the aggregate labor supply through the behavior
of individual workers and firms. As the supply of high ability workers increases, more firms have an incentive
to offer employment opportunities that better accommodate them. This is similar to the intuition put
forth by Acemoglu (1997, 1998). The key distinction here is that shifts in labor demands are not wholly
skill-biased. Informational constraints surrounding production inhibit firms from directing the efforts of all
their workers perfectly, providing micro foundations for job polarization as opposed skill-biased-technological
change.
We should point out that these are not competing insights, nor do they speak necessarily to the same
economic phenomenon. The framework here emphasizes information constraints that exist for workers of
any ability. Job composition is a tool used to alter recruiting quality, rather than mitigate price effects of
scarce factors, avoid search costs, or capture larger markets for skill-specific technologies. In any case, recent
trends do not suggest that shifts in labor demand have been solely-skill biased.
5 Generalization
Our last goal is to demonstrate how the results above can be generalized to an economy with principals that
offer multiple occupations, as opposed to just two. Like before, each principal a fixed span of control over the
information environment, but can divide that capability over nk employment positions, for positive and finite
values of nk. Again suppose firms can choose between two organizational forms; the first (GJM.1) divides the
production process into jobs with relatively similar degrees of monitoring, while the second (GJM.2) creates
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some occupations with very strong performance payments (e.g. upper-management) and subsequently some
jobs with weak incentive contracts. Furthermore, the number of different occupations, described by nk, can
vary across each job mix. Then the two generalized job mixes available to firms are
γ11 < γ
1
2 < ... < γ
1
n1 with
n1∏
i=1
γi = Γ (GJM.1)
and
γ21 < γ
2
2 < ... < γ
2
n2 with
n2∏
i=1
γi = Γ (GJM.2)
The first organizational form is assumed to provide a more equal division of labor in that occupations do not
differ greatly in terms of monitoring. Specifically, let the relative supervision of each task across strategies
satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property about a particular occupation M > 1, so that
γ2M−j−1
γ1M−j−1
<
γ2M−j
γ1M−j
and
γ2M+j
γ1M+j
<
γ2M+j+1
γ1M+j+1
(MLRP)
for all j ≥ 1. We also assume n1 ≤ n2 and that γ1h '= γ2i ∀ h, i.18 Under these generalizations the following
result is obtained:
Proposition 6 Suppose that the compositions of jobs that principals can offer are given by GJM.1 and
GJM.2, and that MLRP holds. Then a full equilibrium exists and is unique.
Proof. See Appendix
The qualitative features of the basic model are maintained by the generalized composition of jobs: prin-
cipals offer JPE wage schemes; agents are positively assigned to occupations and positively matched to other
agents in the same job mix; and firms differ in the skill-content of their work force without bias. Proposition
2 is maintained. As more firms choose to offer a highly diverse array of occupations, a` la GIM.2, they
will necessarily recruit more agents from the top and bottom of the skill distribution, based on the positive
assignment of workers to occupations. The subsequent matching of workers causes the averages abilities of
those employed by the same firm to converge. Likewise, skill accumulation leads to job polarization, as fewer
firms will offer jobs according to GJM.1 when high ability workers are abundant19.
18Restricting n1 ≤ n2 ensures that the relative diversity of job mix GJM.2 is satisfied for all occupations. Lastly, using the
maximum likelihood ratio property to relate the different job mixes is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition to maintain the
insights of the basic model in the generalized case. MLRP is chosen because of it familiarity.
19Following the derivation of a unique equilibrium under the generalized model in the appendix, it is a simple comparative
statics exercise to extend propositions 2 and 3 to an environment with multiple occupations.
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6 Conclusion
We examined the multiple-agent contracting problem in a general equilibrium setting where principals re-
cruit agents from a heterogenous pool. The trade-off that principals face between quality recruiting outcomes
and quality performance leads to endogenous differences in organizational structure, the provision of perfor-
mance incentives, matching patterns across teams. Though different organizational choices lead to different
compositions of agents recruited, average recruiting outcomes are similar for all principals.
When principals must coordinate performance incentives in a general equilibrium environment, we have
shown that team formation between agents exhibits two distinct, and inversely related, forms of positive
assortative matching. As a result, the degree of heterogeneity within teams (intensive margin) is inversely
related to the share of firms that offer a diverse mix of jobs. A key feature of these matching patterns
is that they are the result of strategical complementarities between agent efforts, rather than exogenous
physical complementarities in the production process. Environments with sequential effort decisions or
other coordination of effort levels would generate stronger incentives for assortative matching, and thus
organizational differences to arise in equilibrium. Therefore we feel these results apply generally to firms
with many common production processes.
We applied the principal-agent framework developed to the relationship between firms and workers to
examine labor market outcomes with regard to job mix and performance payments. An abundance of
high-ability workers was shown to generate job polarization, or hollowing-out of the middle class. Also, a
greater share of firms offer a steep mix of incentive contracts when the distribution of labor productivity
is skewed upward. As high-ability workers obtain payments more closely tied to their performance, overall
wage inequality rises. Yet, because of worker matching behavior across occupations, skill accumulation and
the ensuing polarization soften wage dispersion within firms.
Though the main exposition of the model is highly stylized, we have shown how it could be extended
for applications to other environments. Any choices regarding the compositions of jobs that respect the
monotone likelihood ratio property would produce similar insights to the simple model in the text. As many
familiar distributions (e.g. exponential, or normal) satisfy the property, and have density functions with
simple parameterizations, our approach can be used to model firm behavior over several occupations in more
sophisticated contexts.
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Appendix
Derivation of Principal’s Choice of JPE Wage Scheme: Proof of Proposition 1
Given that there is an optimal level of effort that each principal wishes to induce, the dual problem is to
minimize reward payments, subject the agents’ incentive compatibility conditions. The optimal wage scheme
aligns the principal’s unit cost function
2Γp(ei)p(ej)[V s − V w] + γip(ei)V w + γjp(ej)V w
with agents’ willingness to supply effort in equation (1). Implicit differentiation of the unit cost function
condition gives
dV s
dV w
=
−[γip(ei)(1− γjp(ej))− γjp(ej)(1− γip(e))]
2Γp(ei)p(ej)
(A.1)
Calculating the slope of the first order condition for effort provided by agent i gives
dV s
dV w
=
−(1− γjp(ej))U ′(V w)
γp(ej)U ′(V s)
(A.2)
Equating (A.1) and (A.2) yields
U ′(V w)
U ′(V s)
=
γip(ei)(1− γjp(ej)) + γjp(ej)(1− γip(ei))
2γip(ei)(1− γjp(ej)) > 1
Agents are risk averse, and so U ′(V w) > U ′(V s) implies that V s > V w.
When principals recruit heterogeneous agents, only one of the agent’s effort decision will bind the perfor-
mance contract offered20. With decreasing returns the marginal return to effort is greatest for agents who
put forth less effort, all else equal. Thus equation (A.2) must correspond to the lowest ability agent recruited
by the principal. When agent i puts forth less effort that agent j, the choice by each principal to offer JPE
incentive contracts after equating (A.1) and (A.2) is readily apparent.
Existence and Uniqueness of Full Equilibrium: Proof of Propositions 2 & 3
Proposition 1 and the properties of equations (1) through (3) ensure that efforts, performance payments
to agents, matching and job assignments are uniquely determined given the compositions of occupations
available. Thus the existence of an unique equilibrium hinges on unique values of the ability cutoffs between
occupations: A1 & A2. The composition of jobs available in equilibrium is determined by the incentives of
firms to offer each job mix, as constrained by the fact that employment must be balanced.21
Consider the Balance condition. Total differentiation reveals that it has slope equal to dA2dA1 = −
g(A1)
g(A2)
. An
unique equilibrium exists if the Recruiting Indifference Condition (equation 6) insects the Balance condition
(equation 7) exactly once. Thus it is sufficient to show that the Balance Condition is everywhere more
steeply sloped, and lies on or above the Recruiting Indifference Condition condition for any potential value
of A1.
Implicit differentiation of the Recruiting Indifference Condition conditions yields
dA2
dA1
= −g (A1)
g (A2)
A1
A2
(
Πaγ2 −Πaγ1
Πaγ2 −Πaγ1
)
(A.3)
Consider the right hand side of equation (A.3). First, A1 ≤ A2 and secondly, profits increase faster in the
skills of agents receiving greater direction from the principal, i.e. Πaγ2 −Πaγ2 +Πaγ1 −Πaγ1 > 0. Therefore
the right hand side is strictly greater than − g(A1)g(A2) . The Balance condition is everywhere more steeply sloped,
20From equation (3) there positive assortment across occupations such that all teams are heterogeneous in a non-degenerate
distribution of ability.
21Existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium when the intersection of the Balance and Recruiting Indifference conditions has
a corner solution is trivial. As described in Proposition 3, a corner solution can only exist where principals all select the same
organization form with a job mix according to k=1.
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intersecting the Recruiting Indifference Condition at most once. This establishes the criterion for uniqueness.
The Balance condition places a lower bound of aMed on any equilibrium value of A2. Existence then
requires that the Recruiting Indifference Condition intersects the Balance condition for A2 no less than the
median ability. Given the relative slopes of the two equilibrium conditions, it is sufficient to show that the
Balance condition lies on or below the Recruiting Indifference Condition at aMed.
For each cutoff value A2, the expected ability of a recruited foreman in job mix k=2 will be at least the
cutoff value, since higher skilled agents are potential recruits. So as A2 → aMed it must be that aγ2 > aMed.
On the other hand, as A2 → aMed it must be that aγ1 → aMed. Note that profits increase faster in the
ability of an agent with closer supervision (i.e. the foreman in job mix k=2), and the expected ability of
agents recruited to be foreman exceeds the median level of ability. Therefore values of A2 which satisfy
the IC condition are no less than the median level: that is, for A2 = aMed we have Π(aγ1 , aγ1 , γ1, γ1) <
Π(aγ2 , aγ2 , γ2, γ2). Since the value A2 = aMed satisfies the Balance condition, the criterion for existence is
met.
The fact that for A2 = aMed we have Π(aγ1 , aγ1 , γ1, γ1) < Π(aγ2 , aγ2 , γ2, γ2) also establishes the result in
Proposition 3.
Existence and Uniqueness of Full Equilibrium-General Case: Proof of Proposition 6
Under the generalized definitions of job compositions in GJM.1 and GJM.2, many of the previous equi-
librium conditions are unchanged: agent efforts still satisfy equation (1); principals offer a JPE wage scheme
to manage the incentives of heterogeneous teammates as in equation (2); for any mix of jobs, agents’ abilities
are supermodular in payoffs, as in equation (3), so that matches between workers are positively assorted;
agent abilities and the advising associated with occupations in GJM.1 and GJM.2 are supermodular in the
agents’ payoffs, so that agents are positively assigned to jobs as in (4).
It remains the case that principals must be indifferent between their choice of job mix and that firms
must hire workers for each occupation so that employment is balanced in equilibrium. But the Recruiting
Indifference Condition and Balance conditions must be modified to accommodate the greater array of jobs
available.
With several occupations there is a series of Balance conditions that must be satisfied. Regardless of
the mix of occupations that firms choose, they will hire one worker per job type. Using γ21 as the reference
occupation for each job mix without loss of generality, the Generalized Balance conditions requires that for
all occupations j > 1, in job mix k = 2 the following holds∫
Ωγ21
dG(a) =
∫
Ωγ2j
dG(a) (GBC.1)
Employment in the alternate job mix must also be balanced and evenly divide the remaining mass of workers.
The series of Balance conditions for job mix k = 1 across all occupations j is
1− n2
∫
Ωγ21
dG(a) = n1
∫
Ωγ1j
dG(a) (GBC.2)
Given positive assignment over the number n1+n2 of different occupations available there are n1+n2−1
cutoff values that need to be determined to describe a full equilibrium (Walras’ Law). The Generalized
Balance conditions provide n1 + n2 − 2 implicit functions of the ability cutoff levels; the missing conditions
arise because the mass of agents in one occupation cannot be related to itself, and the upper bound of Ωγ2n2
is fixed exogenously at amax (or symmetrically the lower bound of Ωγ2n2 is fixed exogenously at amin). The
final equilibrium condition is Recruiting Indifference Condition regarding job mix offered by principals.
Define aγ
k
j as the expected ability of a worker employed in the jth occupation (equal to the median ability
level of agents assigned to γkj ) at firm choosing the composition of jobs given by k, according to GJM.1 and
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GJM.2. Define the nk vector of supervision allocated to each occupation when offering job mix k as
$γk = [γk1 , γ
k
2 , ..., γ
j
nk ]
and the corresponding expected recruits as
$aγk = [aγ
k
1 , aγ
k
2 , ..., a
γknj ] .
Then the Recruiting Indifference Condition is
Π
(
$aγ1 ,$γ1
) ≡ Π ($aγ2 ,$γ2) (GIC)
The Recruiting Indifference Condition provides an implicit function of the equilibrium cutoff values for each
occupation via the definitions of aγ
k
j .
Together the Recruiting Indifference Condition and Balance conditions provide n1 + n2 − 1 equations in
n1 + n2 − 1 unknown ability cutoffs for different occupations. Therefore it only remains to show that the
Recruiting Indifference Condition and Balance conditions determine unique ability cutoffs between occupa-
tions.
To verify existence of an equilibrium we find a correspondence, F(·), that maps the [amin, amax]n1+n2−1
space onto itself, such that any fixed point is an equilibrium. Then we demonstrate that the correspondence
indeed contains a fixed point.
As the correspondence must be defined such that any fixed point is an equilibrium we write F(·) =
[FIC , FBC21 , FBC22 , ..., FBC1n1 ] to accommodate each equilibrium requirement. We need to define three types
of correspondences: one for indifference, one for balance within job mix k=2, and one for balance in job mix
k=1. Let
FIC ($aγ1 ,$aγ2) =
{
($yγ1 , $yγ2) ∈ [amin, amax]n1+n2−1 :∣∣Π ($yγ1 , $γ1)−Π ($yγ2 , $γ2) ∣∣ ≤ ∣∣Π($˙yγ1 , $γ1)−Π($˙yγ2 , $γ2) ∣∣,
∀($˙yγ1 , $˙yγ2) ∈ [amin, amax]n1+n2−1
}
(A.4)
so that the correspondence maps vectors of abilities into the least non-negative value of the Recruiting
Indifference Condition. Also, for occupations j define
FBC2j ($a
γ1 ,$aγ2) =
{(
$bγ1 ,$bγ2
)
∈ [amin, amax]n1+n2−1 :∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Ω("bγ1 ,"bγ2)
γ21
dG(a)−
∫
Ω("bγ1 ,"bγ2)
γ2j
dG(a)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Ω("˙bγ1 ,"˙bγ2 )γ21
dG(a)−
∫
Ω("˙bγ1 ,"˙bγ2 )γ2j
dG(a)
∣∣∣∣∣,
∀($˙bγ1 ,$˙bγ2) ∈ [amin, amax]n1+n2−1
}
(A.5)
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and
FBC1j ($a
γ1 ,$aγ2) =
{(
$bγ1 ,$bγ2
)
∈ [amin, amax]n1+n2−1 :∣∣∣∣∣
(
1− (2n2 − 1)
2n1 − 1
) ∫
Ω("bγ1 ,"bγ2)
γ21
dG(a)−
∫
Ω("bγ1 ,"bγ2)
γ2j
dG(a)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣
(
1− (2n2 − 1)
2n1 − 1
) ∫
Ω("˙bγ1 ,"˙bγ2 )γ21
dG(a)−
∫
Ω("˙bγ1 ,"˙bγ2 )γ2j
dG(a)
∣∣∣∣∣,
∀($˙bγ1 ,$˙bγ2) ∈ [amin, amax]n1+n2−1
}
(A.6)
so that these correspondences map vectors of abilities into the least non-negative values of the Balance
conditions.
The are several things to note about these correspondences. First, they are everywhere hemicontinuous.
Second, they are each defined over the convex, compact set of abilities [amin, amax]. Lastly, all together,
F(·) maps [amin, amax]n1+n2−1 onto [amin, amax]n1+n2−1. So by Kakutani’s theorem, these correspondences
have a fixed point. Each correspondence is defined to map vectors of ability into the least non-negative
values of the equilibrium conditions. If each correspondence maps to a fixed point, then it must return
cutoff vectors that satisfy equal expected profits across job mixes and equal mass of employment across
occupations. Because such a fixed point must exist, so must an equilibrium. The last step is to establish
uniqueness.
A sufficient condition for uniqueness is that the Jacobian matrix of the equilibrium conditions is sign-
definite. (Notice the similarity with the proof of uniqueness for the simple case above. Sign-definiteness
corresponds to the intersecting equilibrium conditions everywhere having slopes greater or less than one
another, and hence crossing only once.) With positive assignment, the range of abilities employed in each
occupation is convex so that we can describe the equilibrium using the upper-ability cutoffs for each occu-
pation22; we define the upper-ability cutoff for occupation γkj as Akj . Without loss of generality we write
the column-elements of the Jacobian matrix as the derivative of each equilibrium condition, with respect to
Akj for job mix k = 2 and then k = 1, in ascending order of j. Then we write the row-elements with the
Recruiting Indifference Condition (GIC) stacked over the Balance conditions (GBC.2 then GBC.1).
Then the Jacobian matrix of the system of equilibrium conditions is
dΠ2
dA21
dΠ2
dA22
dΠ2
dA23
· · · dΠ1
dA11
dΠ1
dA12
· · · dΠ2dA1n1
G(A21) −G(A22) 0 0 0 0 · · · 0
G(A21) 0 −G(A23) 0 0 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . . 0 0 · · · 0
G(A21) 0 0 0 −n1n2G(A11) 0 · · · 0
G(A21) 0 0 0 0 −n1n2G(A22) · · · 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . . 0
G(A21) 0 0 0 0 0 · · · −n1n2G(A2n1)

As we are only interested in the sign-definiteness of the matrix above, it is helpful is write it simply in
22Recall that the definition in (MLRP) does not make pairwise comparisons for all occupations so that each Akj may demark
a cutoff between occupations in the same, or alternate job mixes. Such a definition is not be necessary to establish a unique
equilibrium. We allow arbitrary orderings to maintain generality.
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terms of the signs of each element. 
+ + + + + + · · · +
+ − 0 0 0 0 · · · 0
+ 0 − 0 0 0 · · · 0
+ 0 0 − 0 0 · · · 0
+ 0 0 0 − 0 · · · 0
+ 0 0 0 0 − · · · 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . . 0
+ 0 0 0 0 0 · · · −

It is straightforward to verify that the determinants of the principal minors of this matrix alternate in
sign, so that the Jacobian must be a negative-definite matrix. This verifies uniqueness of the generalized
equilibrium.
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